I grew up with everyone keeping shomer negiah but I never learned the actual sources inside, and I have real questions about how it works.
1. Where is the Torah source for negiah? People point to lo sikrevu legalos ervah (Vayikra 18:6). The Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos (lav 353) counts touching as part of that Torah prohibition, and the Ramban argues on him right there. Then in Issurei Biah 21:1 the Rambam himself gives makas mardus, which sounds derabanan, and the Raavad there says the Torah only forbade the act itself. So what is it actually, Torah or derabanan, and does it depend on the kind of touch?
2. What does the word touch even mean here? A handshake, a tap on the shoulder, brushing past someone on a bus, helping someone up off the floor? Is the line chibah, touching with affection, or pleasure, or any physical contact at all? Where does the halacha actually draw it?
3. What about people who grew up kissing on the cheek their whole lives, family custom or social custom, like kissing your aunt or a cousin at a simcha, or the way Sefardi and Middle Eastern families greet each other? If there is no romance and no pleasure in it, just the custom everyone in the family does, is that inside the prohibition or outside it?
4. When dating, what exactly is allowed and what is not, and why? If the whole point of dating is to build toward marriage, how does the halacha expect two people to know if they are attracted to each other with zero touch at all?
5. What is the point of the issur altogether? Is it a fence for arayos, is it about kedusha and how a person relates to their own body, or is the physical contact itself the problem? The answer changes how every edge case comes out.
6. And relations before marriage, where does that issur come from, Torah or derabanan? And does anything change if the woman goes to the mikveh first?
rabbi, a follow up on the general direction here. maybe technically all of this is right. but the ramban on kedoshim tihyu (vayikra 19:2) says almost the opposite worry: the Torah forbade the arayos and the forbidden foods, and permitted a man his wife, and meat and wine. so a person of appetite could find room to wallow in lust with his wife or his many wives, to be a wine guzzler and a glutton, and to speak every kind of filth, because the Torah never spelled out an issur for it, and he would be, in the ramban’s words, a naval birshut haTorah, a scoundrel acting with the Torah’s permission. that is why the pasuk adds a general command, kedoshim tihyu, be separate even from what is permitted.
1. if the ramban is right that halacha is the floor and not the ceiling of avodas Hashem, then when the answer to negiah or pilegesh or dancing is basically “technically allowed”, what happens to the ramban? is naval birshut haTorah a real halachic category with teeth, or a mussar idea that stops at the door of psak?
2. the classic examples seem to prove the floor idea. marrying many wives is technically mutar and nobody does it, because choosing it anyway wrecks the home and the community. a person who grabs every technical heter for touch or pleasure, each one defensible on its own, ends up destroying something bigger. is the ramban saying the aggregate matters even when every single piece is permitted?
3. on the other side, how does a person tell going above the line from plain fear? electricity on shabbos, is treating it as assur a real kedusha move or a fear based chumra with no source? and with maaser, if the strict halacha would allow giving less, choosing the full ten percent out of emuna and bitachon is going above the line in the good way. what is the test that separates real lifnim mishuras hadin from anxiety dressed up as frumkeit?
4. so when a person asks “is this mutar”, is the complete answer ever just “yes”? or does kedoshim tihyu itself demand a second question: not only may a person do this, but should a person who wants to be close to Hashem do this?
bottom line basically: is naval birshut haTorah binding inside the halachic system, or is it extra credit that halacha itself never demands?
There is an old Chassidic joke that asks: How do we know from the Torah that a Jew has to wear a shtreimel? The answer is, “ויצא יעקב מבאר שבע וילך חרנה.” Yaakov left Be’er Sheva and went to Charan. You think he went without a shtreimel?
It is funny because it illustrates a very common mistake in learning. We already have an idea in our heads, and then we read that idea into the words of the Torah or the Rishonim even though it is not actually there.
I think that is happening here with the Ramban.
The Ramban is certainly saying something very important in Kedoshim Tihyu. He says that the Torah can prohibit arayot and forbidden foods, while technically permitting relations with one’s wife, meat, wine and many other pleasures. A person could therefore become a בעל תאוה, someone completely dominated by appetite, while carefully staying on the permitted side of every individual law. He could be שטוף בזימת אשתו, obsessed with sexual activity, a סובא יין, a drunkard, a זולל בשר, a glutton, and speak every kind of disgusting language, and still argue that he never violated a specific prohibition. That person is the Ramban’s famous נבל ברשות התורה.
But notice what the Ramban is describing. He is describing excess, obsession and a life controlled by appetite. He is not saying that every permitted pleasure is spiritually defective. He certainly does not say that every physical contact between a man and woman should therefore be avoided.
That distinction is extremely important for our earlier discussion of negiah. If shaking a woman’s hand in a courtroom, helping her walk up a flight of stairs, helping someone who fell, or some other non-affectionate contact is not the kind of דרך תאוה or דרך חיבה that the prohibition addresses, Kedoshim Tihyu does not magically turn it into an issur. You cannot first assume that all touching is somehow bad and then insert that assumption into the Ramban’s words.
The Gemara itself should make that obvious. Ulla would kiss his sisters on their hands, according to another version on the chest, and the Gemara itself says ופליגא דידיה אדידיה, that Ulla appears to contradict himself, because elsewhere he warned people to stay away from unnecessary closeness. (Avodah Zarah 17a.) The Gemara did not hide the story. It put both statements next to each other. Likewise, Rav Acha put a bride on his shoulders and danced with her. When the other rabbis asked whether they could do the same, he answered: אי דמיין עלייכו ככשורא לחיי, ואי לא לא. If to you she is like a wooden beam, fine; if not, don’t do it. (Ketubot 17a.)
To me, these Gemaras are telling us precisely that you cannot create one universal psychological rule for every human being. If something creates sexual excitement or inappropriate closeness for you, then you may very well need a personal geder. For one person even a handshake may be a problem. For another person a social kiss on the cheek may mean absolutely nothing. That personal geder is not “extra frumkeit.” It is common sense. You know yourself and you protect yourself from something that actually presents a danger to you.
That is very different from declaring that because something is permitted, a holy person ought automatically to prohibit it.
In fact, Chazal warn us against exactly that mentality. The Yerushalmi says, לא דייך מה שאסרה לך תורה אלא שאתה מבקש לאסור עליך דברים אחרים, “Is it not enough what the Torah prohibited that you seek to prohibit additional things upon yourself?” The Rambam quotes this directly when warning against unnecessary self-denial. (Hilchot De’ot 3.) We also have the principle כל הפטור מן הדבר ועושהו נקרא הדיוט, that there are circumstances where someone who insists on doing something from which Halachah exempts him is not called especially righteous, but a hedyot.
So is the Ramban arguing with Chazal? Of course not.
The Mesilat Yesharim explains the structure beautifully. He does not begin his book with prishut. He begins with zehirut, then zerizut, then nekiyut. Only in chapter 13 does he reach prishut, and he says explicitly:
הפרישות הוא תחלת החסידות
Prishut is the beginning of chassidut.
And then he says something even more important:
שכל מה שביארנו עד עתה הוא מה שמצטרך אל האדם לשיהיה צדיק, ומכאן ולהלאה הוא לשיהיה חסיד
Everything discussed until this point is what a person needs in order to be a tzaddik. From this point forward he is discussing becoming a chassid.
One point that many people miss about Mesilat Yesharim is that the sefer is sequential. It is not like a collection of independent chapters on different good middot that you can open wherever you like. Ramchal is describing a ladder: first zehirut, then zerizut, then nekiyut, and only after a person has worked through those stages does he arrive at prishut. You cannot simply jump to prishut while skipping the basic work that comes before it. That changes the entire meaning of the sefer. Prishut was never presented as the starting standard for every ordinary Jew. It is an advanced stage in a carefully ordered process of spiritual development.
That is a completely different picture from telling every twelve-year-old that every possible pleasure and every possible heter should frighten him.
Prishut is an advanced avodah. A person who has already developed zehirut, zerizut and nekiyut knows himself well enough to recognize particular areas where permitted things are pulling him in an unhealthy direction. He may then limit those things as part of his own avodat Hashem. Mesilat Yesharim himself describes prishut as deliberately withdrawing from certain permitted pleasures so that they do not lead a person toward something harmful.
It therefore has to make sense.
If a person knows that alcohol takes control of him, perhaps his prishut should involve alcohol. If somebody becomes obsessed with food, perhaps his avodah is there. If somebody knows that particular interactions with the opposite sex immediately lead him somewhere unhealthy, he should establish boundaries there. Someone else may have none of those problems and may need to work on anger, money, kavod or something entirely different.
That is real prishut. It is customized spiritual work, not collecting random chumrot.
The Ramban’s example of sexual relations makes the same point. He does not say marital relations are bad. He says a person could become שטוף, completely consumed by them. He quotes the idea that talmidei chachamim should not be מצויין אצל נשיהן כתרנגולין. He is describing someone whose life has become excessively centered on sexuality. There is a very large difference between that and saying that an ordinary permitted expression of affection or human contact must therefore be avoided.
The same is true of his reference to “his wife or his many wives.” The Ramban is not announcing that having multiple wives is inherently immoral. His point is that even within entirely permitted relationships a person could become controlled by sexual appetite. Leaving aside later communal enactments, local laws and changes in culture, the number of wives is not his essential point. The בעל התאוה is his point.
That is also why I would not use Kedoshim Tihyu to create new prohibitions about electricity, food, clothing, touching, or anything else. If Halachah says something is permitted, then it is permitted. Calling an unsupported prohibition “kedushah” does not make it kedushah. Sometimes it may actually be the opposite, because a person is replacing the Torah’s boundaries with boundaries of his own imagination.
On the other hand, there certainly is a second question beyond “Is it mutar?” A mature person can ask, “Is this good for me? Is this becoming excessive? Is this bringing me closer to Hashem or taking over my life?” That is a legitimate question. But the answer will not necessarily be the same for everybody.
So I would distinguish three completely different levels.
First is Halachah. What is actually assur and what is mutar?
Second is a personal geder. I know myself, and although this particular thing may be permitted generally, for me it is likely to lead somewhere it should not, so I stay away from it.
Third is prishut and chassidut. A person who has developed to that level deliberately limits certain permitted pleasures in order to refine himself and increase his kedushah.
The mistake is taking level three and turning it into level one for everybody else.
Kedoshim Tihyu is a very real part of the Torah. The Ramban even calls it a מצוה כללית, a broad Torah command. But a broad command to live a holy life is not a license for us to manufacture hundreds of new universal prohibitions. The Ramban is warning us not to become people controlled by permitted indulgence. He is not telling us that everything permitted should make us nervous.
And certainly I would not use the Ramban to overturn the Gemara itself. Rav Acha dancing with the bride on his shoulders was not being a נבל ברשות התורה. Ulla was not violating Kedoshim Tihyu every time he kissed his sister. The Gemara recorded those stories precisely because human beings and circumstances are different.
The goal is not to be afraid of everything permitted. The goal is to know the Halachah, know yourself, and eventually know where your own avodat Hashem requires more from you.
a follow up on the pilegesh part:
1. is there such a thing as a pilegesh relationship with affection but without relations? or does the Sanhedrin 21a definition assume consummation, so that removing relations puts you back in the ordinary negiah discussion?
2. my concern is that if the woman has not gone to mikveh she is a niddah, which is an ervah, and the Rambam in Issurei Biah 21:1 gives malkot for chibuk v’nishuk of an ervah derech ta’ava. that would make kissing in that situation more severe, not less. is that correct?
3. and if so, is there any intermediate step at all, or is it either no affectionate contact or the full framework with exclusivity and mikveh?
Thank you Rabbi, thank you very much.
I know that this will create a lot of controversy, but people come here for the truth, so they will get the truth.
https://kashrut.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/The-Halachic-Perspective-on-Premarital-Relationships.pdf
https://kashrut.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/The-Jewish-Laws-on-Touching-and-Looking-at-Women.pdf
I think the first mistake is defining shomer negiah as “a man may never touch a woman.” If that were the Halachah, the Gemara itself would be very difficult to understand. Ulla would come home and kiss his sisters on their hands …. according to another version, on their chests …. and the Gemara immediately says ופליגא דידיה אדידיה, “Ulla contradicts himself,” because Ulla himself said that ordinary kirvah should be avoided: לך לך אמרין נזירא, סחור סחור לכרמא לא תקרב (Avodah Zarah 17a). Rav Acha would put the bride on his shoulders and dance. When the other rabbis asked whether they could do the same, he answered: אי דמיין עלייכו ככשורא …. לחיי, ואי לא …. לא: if to you she is like a wooden beam, fine; otherwise, no (Ketubot 17a). And there are many more similar stories. Why would the Gemara preserve stories like these if touching itself were the prohibition? I understand the line as derech chibah or derech ta’avah …. touching that creates or expresses sexual or romantic closeness …. not the mere physical fact that two people made contact. The Rambam himself describes the Torah prohibition as hugging or kissing דרך תאוה ונהנה בקרוב בשר. Helping somebody walk, helping them up the stairs, an ordinary handshake, or other contact that has no such character is therefore a very different question. And these Gemaras show another element as well: people are not identical. Something that creates improper closeness for one person may genuinely mean nothing to another. That is the approach I discussed at greater length in my earlier article (in the comments).
As for relationships before marriage, there is another subject that today is almost treated as though it were a joke or a euphemism for an affair: pilegesh. That is not what the classical concept means. It is a committed relationship without the full framework of kiddushin and ketubah; it is not promiscuity, and the laws of niddah still apply. The Yaavetz, R. Yaakov Emden, has a remarkable teshuvah on this (She’elat Yaavetz II:15). He argues strongly that such a relationship can actually serve as a siyag against promiscuity and can also increase pru urvu. He was quite unhappy that this legitimate framework had effectively disappeared, writing that closing the door to the permissible can cause people to fall into much more serious prohibitions.
I should emphasize that this is not the way these subjects are commonly taught in Orthodox communities today. Most communities use a much broader rule of complete avoidance of physical contact between unmarried men and women, and the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch themselves contain additional stringent language regarding affectionate contact even with certain relatives. But they still need to fit with the Gemaras. I am explaining how I understand these Gemaras and why I do not think the slogan “Halachah says men and women cannot touch” accurately describes what the sources themselves say. The actual question is what kind of contact it is, what it means, and what effect it has on the people involved.
Hello Rabbi,
What about dancing? Under what you wrote it makes sense that you can dance with your wife, daughter or family members that are close to you, is this correct?
And what about friends that you treat and care as just friends?
Is going to a discoteque to dance a problem?
Technically speaking if there is no improper feelings, and it does not affect you, you should be able to.