Hi Rabbi Abadi,
Thank you for your previous explanation about rabbinic laws and what happens when their original reason disappears.
I wanted to understand how this principle applies to three other cases:
Meat and fish: Chazal prohibited eating meat and fish together because of a health danger. Today, there doesn’t seem to be a medically recognized danger from combining them. Why does this prohibition remain while uncovered liquids are permitted in places where snakes are not prevalent?
Medicine on Shabbat: Chazal restricted taking medicine because of the concern of grinding herbs. Today, most medicines are manufactured industrially, and people generally don’t prepare their own medicine. Would this be considered a permanent gezerah, or could the disappearance of the original concern affect the prohibition?
Mayim Acharonim: Tosafot in Eruvin 17b explain that people no longer practiced Mayim Acharonim because melach Sedomit was not commonly found. Yet the Shulchan Aruch (OC 181:1) still calls it obligatory. If the original danger is no longer prevalent, why would the obligation remain?
In these cases, how do we determine whether the original concern was simply the reason behind a permanent enactment or a condition that limits when the prohibition applies? Is there something specific in the Gemara or Rishonim that helps us distinguish between the two?
Thank you!


These are excellent questions, and they all involve an important principle in understanding Halacha.
There is a general rule in the Gemara (Beitzah 5a):
כל דבר שבמנין צריך מנין אחר להתירו
A formal rabbinic enactment does not automatically disappear simply because its original reason no longer exists.
However, not every rabbinic restriction is necessarily an unconditional, permanent enactment. Sometimes the restriction was specifically tied to a particular danger or circumstance. When that circumstance no longer exists, the prohibition may no longer apply.
The Taz (Yoreh Deah 116:1) makes this distinction explicitly when discussing uncovered liquids. He explains that the rule requiring another Beit Din to repeal an enactment does not apply there because the original restriction was specifically concerned with snakes.
With that in mind, let’s examine your three examples.
1. Meat and Fish
The Gemara (Pesachim 76b) discusses a medical danger from combining meat and fish, and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 116:2) prohibits eating them together because of the concern for Tzaraat.
This is a medical concern, not a Torah prohibition concerning the combination of meat and fish.
The Magen Avraham (OC 173:1) raises the possibility that the danger no longer exists because circumstances or human physiology may have changed.
The Aruch HaShulchan (YD 116:10) also discusses this concept, mentioning that certain medical dangers described in the Gemara are no longer applicable, although he does not eliminate the restriction himself.
Today, we have far more extensive medical knowledge and experience. There is no established medical evidence that properly prepared meat and fish become dangerous simply because they are eaten together.
Therefore, eating meat and fish together nowadays is permitted. The original prohibition was based on a specific medical danger, and there is no reason to apply that danger when it is not present.
I recognize that many Poskim continue to prohibit the combination, but I do not believe that we should perpetuate an outdated medical assumption as though it were an independent Torah prohibition.
2. Medicine on Shabbat
The Shulchan Aruch (OC 328:1) explicitly identifies the reason for the prohibition:
גזירה משום שחיקת סממנים
The concern was that someone preparing medicine might grind medicinal herbs or ingredients on Shabbat, violating the Melacha of Tochen.
That was a realistic concern when people routinely prepared their own medicines.
Today, ordinary pharmaceutical medications are manufactured industrially. Someone taking a Tylenol or another commercially produced tablet is not going to manufacture that medication by grinding herbs in his kitchen.
This distinction is discussed by the Tzitz Eliezer (Vol. 8, Siman 15, Chapter 15), who argues that medicines requiring specialized manufacturing may never have been included in the original concern. He does not issue a blanket permission on that reasoning alone, but the principle is significant.
Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch also discusses a similar argument in Teshuvot VeHanhagot (Vol. 5, Siman 94).
I say that modern factory-produced medications may be taken on Shabbat. The original concern of grinding medicinal ingredients does not apply to these medications. Naturally, this does not permit performing an actual prohibited Melacha in preparing or administering medicine.
3. Mayim Acharonim
The Gemara (Eruvin 17b) explains that Mayim Acharonim was obligatory because of Melach Sedomit, a dangerous salt that could damage the eyes.
Tosafot there explicitly states:
עכשיו לא נהגו במים אחרונים דאין מלח סדומית מצוי בינינו
People no longer practiced Mayim Acharonim because Melach Sedomit was no longer common.
The Shulchan Aruch (OC 181:1) nevertheless states that Mayim Acharonim is obligatory. However, in OC 181:10, he acknowledges that some do not practice it.
Other authorities understand that there are additional considerations, including cleanliness before Birkat Hamazon, and some continue to require it.
My position is that the original obligation is no longer applicable under ordinary modern conditions, although I certainly recommend the practice.
It is a nice and appropriate custom. But I would not put it near the top of someone’s list of religious obligations.
There are far more important Halachot that people need to learn and observe properly.
The General Principle
The essential question is not simply whether the original reason has disappeared. We must first determine the nature and scope of the original enactment.
Was it an independent, unconditional decree established by Chazal? If so, it generally remains binding even when its original reason disappears.
Or was it a restriction specifically dependent upon a particular danger, circumstance, or method of doing something?
In the latter situation, the absence of that condition may mean that the original restriction does not apply.
We determine that by studying the Gemara, the Rishonim, the language of the Shulchan Aruch, and the explanations of the Poskim.
We must also recognize that when Chazal made statements based on the medical knowledge of their time, we have the benefit of centuries of additional experience and scientific information.
We should respect Chazal and understand what they were addressing, rather than mechanically applying an ancient medical concern to situations where it no longer exists.
Halacha requires understanding, not merely repeating conclusions without examining their basis.
Thank you, Rabbi. I understand why the original concerns no longer apply in these cases. But how do we know that Chazal established these restrictions only while the concern existed, rather than as ongoing gezerot? For example, why is the prohibition on medicine different from other rabbinic decrees that remain binding even after the original concern disappears?
I wanted to ask how the same principle applies to three other cases:
Shofar on Shabbat: If the concern is carrying the shofar, why is blowing it still prohibited when it’s already inside the synagogue?
Swimming on Shabbat: If someone has a private pool with permanent walls and no need for a flotation device, does the original prohibition still apply?
Kosher wine: If a non-Jew who doesn’t practice idolatry pours non-mevushal kosher wine, why would it become prohibited if there’s no concern of idol worship?
Are these permanent rabbinic decrees, or could the disappearance of the original concerns change the halacha?
Perfect example. Shofar on Shabbat is a Nimnu VeGamru. You cannot cancel that one. Usually the earlier the Gezera, the stronger it was set up.
Swimming in a river is because of Chavit shel Shaytim. A swimming pool is not a problem. Only a river or a lake. It is right there in Shulchan Aruch. My initial thought is that this is also Nimnu VeGamru, but if it is not, then it should certainly be canceled. I would need to look into that to be sure.
Wine in general was Nimnu VeGamru, but the extra chumra of Issur Hana’ah was not. Once there was no pagan wine rituals, the Chachamim actually removed the Issur Hana’ah and reduced it to just Meshum Chasnut.
You need to learn the Gemara and Rishonim in each case to figure out how it gets categorized. There are some that are Nimnu VeGamru. Then some are tied directly to a reason. The indications are there in each Sugya. There are multiple levels.