Hello,
I have two questions:
– How do we relate nowadays to the concept of dvar charif and how does it affects in the Kashrut of our kitchen or if you eat out?
– Why do we have to do Tevilat Keilim to dishes that we buy in a store to a non human entity, like a company, when the issue stated in the Talmud is related to buying used dishes that belong directly to non Jews?
These are important questions.
Davar Charif
Regarding davar charif: this is an important topic, but it is also one that is often discussed in a fragmented and exaggerated way. I am currently in the middle of preparing a comprehensive article on taruvot (mixtures), where davar charif will be addressed properly, in context, together with the broader halachic framework of absorption, knives, utensils, and real-world kitchen practice.
Rather than giving a partial or oversimplified answer here, I would prefer you wait for that article, which should be published shortly in the Jewish Law section. It will present the issue in an organized and practical way.
Tevilat Keilim
Your second question, regarding tevilat keilim, is an excellent one.
After reviewing the sources, it is clear that tevilat keilim is rooted in the Torah, derived from the verses in Bamidbar dealing with utensils taken from Midyan, and developed in the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b). While the Torah text itself does not explicitly spell out immersion as a standalone mitzvah, Chazal received and transmitted this obligation as binding.
There is a well-known discussion among the Rishonim as to whether tevilat keilim should be classified as de’oraita or derabanan. The Rambam’s language may give the impression that he treats it as rabbinic. However, as the Aruch HaShulchan (Yoreh De’ah 120) explains at length, this does not mean that the Rambam denies its Torah-level authority. Rather, it reflects the Rambam’s methodological distinction between what is explicit in the verse and what is received through tradition. In practice, the Aruch HaShulchan concludes — and states explicitly — that all of the great authorities agree that tevilat keilim is min haTorah.
Once we are dealing with a Torah obligation, an important halachic principle applies:
we do not modify Torah law based on its perceived reason.
There was a minority view among the Tannaim, associated primarily with Rabbi Shimon, that sometimes considered the reason of a mitzvah (darash ta’ama de-kra). However, the overwhelming consensus of Chazal rejects this approach. Even when reasons are discussed, they do not alter the law itself. Once the Torah establishes a requirement, it remains binding regardless of whether the original rationale seems applicable in a given case.
Accordingly, even if one were to suggest that tevilat keilim relates to some form of prior non-Jewish connection or influence, that would not affect the obligation. The rule stands as it is.
For this reason, utensils purchased from a company still require tevilah. A corporation may function as a legal entity for purposes of liability or finance, but that framework does not change halachic ownership realities in this context. Since the majority of manufacturers and sellers are non-Jewish, and since the utensil came into Jewish ownership from that source, tevilat keilim is required.
There may be areas of Halacha — such as certain aspects of ribbit — where corporate structure plays a more substantive role due to the nature of financial transactions. But that logic does not transfer to tevilat keilim.
In short:
Once the Torah (as transmitted by Chazal) requires immersion, we do not suspend or redefine that requirement based on reasoning or modern commercial structures.